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Dedicated	  in	  memory	  of	  Horacio	  Arló-­Costa	  	  	   Narrowly	  construed,	  formal	  epistemology	  is	  a	  methodological	  approach	  to	  traditional	  analytic	  epistemology.	  	  According	  to	  this	  view,	  the	  aim	  of	  formal	  epistemology	  is	  to	  harness	  the	  power	  of	  formal	  methods	  to	  bring	  rigor	  and	  clarity	  to	  traditional	  philosophical	  concerns.	  	  	   Yet,	  in	  broader	  terms,	  formal	  epistemology	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  methodological	  tool	  for	  epistemologists,	  but	  a	  discipline	  in	  its	  own	  right.	  	  On	  this	  programmatic	  view,	  formal	  epistemology	  is	  an	  interdisciplinary	  research	  program	  that	  includes	  work	  by	  philosophers,	  mathematicians,	  computer	  scientists,	  statisticians,	  psychologists,	  operations	  researchers,	  and	  economists	  which	  aims	  to	  give	  mathematical	  and	  sometimes	  computational	  representations	  of,	  along	  with	  sound	  strategies	  for	  reasoning	  about,	  knowledge,	  belief,	  judgment	  and	  decision	  making.	  	  	  This	  essay	  presents	  a	  two-­‐pronged	  argument	  for	  viewing	  formal	  epistemology	  in	  programmatic	  terms.	  The	  first	  part	  addresses	  the	  general	  question	  of	  why	  anyone	  should	  bother	  with	  formal	  methods	  by	  illustrating,	  through	  a	  historical	  example,	  the	  role	  that	  formal	  models	  can	  play	  in	  inquiry.	  The	  second	  part	  describes	  two	  specific	  examples	  of	  recent	  work	  within	  formal	  epistemology,	  one	  that	  addresses	  a	  longstanding	  issue	  within	  traditional	  epistemology—namely,	  what	  to	  make	  of	  coherentist	  justification—and	  another	  addressing	  a	  fallacy	  of	  probabilistic	  reasoning	  which	  has	  implications	  across	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  disciplines,	  thereby	  making	  a	  case	  for	  a	  broader,	  programmatic	  view.	  	  Finally,	  we	  close	  with	  a	  methodological	  proposal	  for	  epistemology	  that	  incorporates	  formal,	  experimental,	  and	  traditional	  approaches	  into	  one.	  	  	  
Why	  be	  formal?	  	   When	  you	  fiddle	  with	  the	  controls	  of	  your	  computer	  to	  select	  a	  color,	  either	  by	  typing	  a	  triplet	  of	  numbers	  to	  specify	  how	  much	  red,	  green,	  and	  blue	  to	  include,	  or	  by	  selecting	  a	  point	  within	  a	  color	  wheel,	  you	  are	  making	  use	  of	  a	  model	  that	  dates	  back	  to	  1802.	  	  It	  was	  that	  year,	  in	  a	  London	  lecture	  hall,	  that	  Thomas	  Young	  first	  speculated	  that	  human	  color	  perception	  involves	  three	  different	  receptors	  in	  
 2	  
the	  eye,	  and	  a	  half-­‐century	  later	  Hermann	  Helmholtz,	  that	  nineteenth	  century	  colossus,	  reckoned	  that	  each	  receptor	  was	  sensitive	  to	  three	  distinct	  frequencies	  of	  light,	  corresponding	  roughly	  to	  our	  perceptions	  of	  red,	  green,	  and	  blue	  (Helmholtz	  1860).	  Helmholtz	  went	  on	  to	  propose	  a	  mathematical	  model	  whereby	  a	  good	  portion	  of	  the	  visible	  color	  spectrum	  can	  be	  represented	  by	  an	  additive	  mixture	  of	  those	  three	  basic	  frequencies.	  Although	  it	  took	  another	  century	  to	  confirm	  the	  physiological	  claims	  behind	  the	  Young-­‐Helmholtz’s	  theory	  of	  color	  vision,	  in	  that	  span	  of	  time	  the	  RBG	  additive	  color	  model	  spurred	  the	  development	  of	  color	  photography,	  halftone	  color	  printing,	  and	  color	  television,	  among	  other	  things.	  	   The	  story	  of	  the	  RBG	  color	  model	  offers	  an	  allegory	  for	  how	  to	  think	  about	  formal	  models.	  	  For	  the	  story	  illustrates	  the	  impact	  a	  formal	  model	  can	  have	  on	  inquiry,	  and	  it	  also	  highlights	  how	  to	  assess	  the	  merits	  of	  a	  formal	  model.	  	  But	  one	  may	  reasonable	  ask	  whether	  the	  analogy	  holds	  for	  epistemology.	  There	  is,	  after	  all,	  plenty	  of	  epistemology	  that	  is	  not	  informed	  by	  formal	  methods,	  and	  plenty	  of	  epistemologists	  seem	  determined	  to	  keep	  it	  that	  way.	  	  Giants	  have	  made	  their	  mark	  with	  little	  more	  than	  commonsense	  and	  a	  smidgeon	  of	  logic.	  	  Why,	  they	  ask,	  bother	  being	  so	  formal?	  	   The	  best	  short	  answer	  is	  one	  given	  years	  ago	  by	  Rich	  Thomason.1	  	  Thomason,	  commenting	  on	  philosophers	  who	  view	  formal	  methods	  as	  a	  distraction	  to	  real	  philosophical	  advancement,	  observed	  that	  the	  only	  real	  advantage	  that	  we	  have	  over	  the	  great	  philosophers	  of	  the	  past	  are	  the	  new	  methods	  that	  we	  have	  at	  our	  disposal.	  	  Probability.	  	  First-­‐order	  logic.	  	  Calculus.	  	  The	  number	  zero.	  	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  imagine	  improving	  on	  Aristotle	  without	  resorting	  to	  methods	  that	  were	  simply	  unavailable	  to	  him.	  	  Knowing	  just	  this	  much	  about	  history,	  a	  better	  question	  is	  this:	  	  why	  limit	  your	  options?	  	   To	  begin	  a	  longer	  answer,	  return	  to	  the	  Young-­‐Helmholtz	  theory	  and	  notice	  three	  important	  stages	  in	  its	  development.	  	  First,	  there	  was	  Young’s	  idea	  that	  people	  with	  normal	  color	  perception	  rely	  on	  three	  receptors	  in	  their	  eyes.	  	  This	  was	  a	  great	  insight,	  but	  there	  was	  neither	  a	  model	  nor	  much	  empirical	  evidence	  for	  it,	  so	  the	  idea	  languished	  for	  50	  years.	  	  At	  that	  time	  common	  wisdom	  held	  that	  those	  three	  receptors	  would	  surely	  be	  sensitive	  to	  red,	  yellow,	  and	  blue,	  since	  Newton’s	  color	  wheel	  designated	  those	  three	  as	  the	  primary	  colors,	  and	  painters	  for	  centuries	  had	  mixed	  their	  paints	  from	  red,	  yellow,	  and	  blue	  bases.	  	  But	  intuition	  and	  tradition	  notwithstanding,	  Young’s	  insight	  went	  nowhere	  until	  Helmholtz	  came	  along.	  	  His	  ingenious	  contribution	  was	  to	  run	  experiments	  in	  which	  subjects	  were	  instructed	  to	  match	  the	  color	  of	  a	  swatch	  to	  a	  color	  of	  their	  choice,	  which	  they	  selected	  by	  mixing	  three	  wavelengths	  of	  light.	  	  He	  also	  observed	  that	  the	  subjects	  could	  not	  make	  a	  match	  with	  only	  two	  of	  those	  three	  basic	  light	  sources.	  	  Helmholtz’s	  experiments	  contributed	  important	  empirical	  evidence	  for	  the	  trichromatic	  account,	  mainly	  by	  offering	  grounds	  for	  replacing	  yellow	  with	  green,	  but	  it	  was	  his	  introduction	  of	  a	  
mathematical	  model	  to	  represent	  visible	  color	  as	  an	  additive	  mixture	  of	  three	  basic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Krister Segerberg recounts Thomason’s remarks in (Segerberg 2005, p. 166). 
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colors	  that	  really	  set	  things	  in	  motion.	  	  Helmholtz’s	  mathematical	  model	  marked	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  second	  stage	  of	  the	  theory,	  one	  which	  unleashed	  a	  number	  of	  innovations.	  	  James	  Maxwell	  introduced	  the	  first	  trichromatic	  color	  photograph	  within	  a	  decade	  of	  Helmholtz’s	  work.	  	  Halftone	  printing	  presses	  came	  along	  soon	  after.	  	  Color	  television	  and	  color	  motion	  pictures	  followed	  several	  decades	  later.	  	  And	  yet,	  all	  of	  these	  developments	  occurred	  well	  before	  the	  last	  stage,	  when	  the	  physiological	  mechanism	  that	  underpins	  the	  Young-­‐Helmholz	  trichromatic	  theory	  of	  color	  vision	  was	  finally	  confirmed.	  	  	  	  	   What	  is	  striking	  about	  this	  schematic	  history	  of	  the	  Young-­‐Helmholz	  theory	  of	  color	  vision	  is	  not	  simply	  the	  outsized	  impact	  of	  the	  RGB	  color	  model	  had	  on	  the	  theory	  and	  on	  other	  developments	  far	  afield,	  but	  the	  timing	  and	  sequence	  of	  events.	  	  I	  wish	  to	  draw	  out	  two	  of	  those	  features	  and	  consider	  what	  lessons	  they	  hold	  for	  epistemology.	  	  
Experimental	  evidence	  is	  important	  but	  far	  from	  sufficient.	  	  	   Some	  philosophers	  have	  attacked	  a	  practice	  within	  traditional	  analytic	  epistemology	  of	  justifying	  normative	  claims	  by	  appeals	  to	  intuition—a	  methodology	  that	  Weinberg,	  Nichols,	  and	  Stich	  have	  dubbed	  	  ‘Intuition	  Driven	  Romanticism	  (Weinberg	  et.	  al.	  2001).	  	  For	  these	  critics,	  the	  first	  part	  of	  the	  Young-­‐Hemlhotz	  history	  will	  resonate,	  for	  Young’s	  insight	  was	  stalled	  because	  people	  at	  that	  time	  were	  mislead	  by	  their	  intuitions	  about	  the	  three	  basic	  ‘colors’	  necessary	  for	  the	  trichromatic	  theory.	  	  It	  was	  Helmholtz’s	  experiments	  that	  set	  the	  program	  on	  the	  right	  track	  by	  identifying	  the	  correct	  set	  of	  frequency	  ranges	  to	  base	  the	  theory	  on.	  	  	  	   Even	  so,	  the	  second	  half	  of	  this	  history	  complicates	  matters	  for	  advocates	  of	  experimental	  philosophy.	  For	  although	  Helmholtz’s	  experiments	  were	  crucial	  for	  pointing	  to	  the	  right	  set	  of	  basic	  ‘colors’,	  the	  experimental	  evidence	  was	  far	  from	  conclusive	  for	  establishing	  the	  central	  physiological	  thesis	  about	  the	  photoreceptors	  in	  the	  human	  eye.	  	  The	  role	  these	  initial	  experiments	  played	  was	  to	  shift	  the	  focus	  from	  an	  unworkable	  RYB	  model	  to	  a	  plausible	  RGB	  additive	  color	  model,	  not	  to	  nail	  down	  the	  RGB	  model	  before	  any	  other	  progress	  could	  be	  made.	  	  	   But	  look	  closely	  at	  Weinberg,	  Nichols,	  and	  Stich’s	  attack	  on	  traditional	  analytic	  epistemology	  and	  you	  will	  see,	  oddly	  enough,	  a	  refashioning	  of	  a	  longstanding	  criticism	  of	  experimental	  psychology	  over	  convenience	  sampling	  (Carlson	  1971,	  Sears	  1986,	  Henrich	  et.	  al.	  2010).	  	  The	  problem	  with	  convenience	  sampling	  in	  social	  psychological	  research	  in	  particular	  is	  the	  problem	  of	  basing	  general	  conclusions	  about	  human	  nature	  on	  results	  garnered	  from	  studies	  of	  undergraduate	  psychology	  students,	  subjects	  who	  are	  overwhelmingly	  WEIRD	  (Henrich	  et.	  al.	  2010):	  	  that	  is,	  members	  of	  Western,	  Educated,	  Industrialized,	  Rich,	  and	  Democratic	  societies.	  	  In	  a	  comparative	  review	  of	  the	  literature,	  Henrich,	  Heine,	  and	  Norenzayan	  found	  that	  WEIRD	  people	  are	  often	  the	  least	  representative	  populations	  in	  studies	  of	  visual	  perception,	  fairness,	  cooperation,	  spatial	  reasoning,	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categorization	  and	  inferential	  induction,	  moral	  reasoning,	  reasoning	  styles,	  self-­‐concepts,	  and	  the	  heritability	  of	  IQ.	  	  They	  remark	  that	  	  	   there	  are	  no	  obvious	  a	  priori	  grounds	  for	  claiming	  that	  a	  particular	  behavioral	  phenomenon	  is	  universal	  based	  on	  sampling	  from	  a	  single	  subpopulation.	  Overall,	  these	  empirical	  patterns	  suggest	  that	  we	  need	  to	  be	  less	  cavalier	  in	  addressing	  questions	  of	  human	  nature	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  data	  drawn	  from	  this	  particularly	  thin,	  and	  rather	  unusual,	  slice	  of	  humanity	  (Henrich	  et.	  al.	  2010,	  p.	  61).	  	  So,	  while	  the	  knock	  against	  traditional	  analytic	  epistemology	  is	  that	  experimental	  evidence	  of	  differences	  in	  epistemic	  intuitions	  among	  different	  groups	  undermines	  claims	  that	  epistemic	  intuitions	  are	  universal	  (Weinberg	  et.	  al.	  2001),	  the	  knock	  against	  experimental	  psychology	  is	  that	  differences	  between	  the	  subpopulation	  used	  for	  the	  lion’s	  share	  of	  studies	  and	  the	  general	  population	  undermines	  ‘species-­‐level’	  generalizations	  (Henrich	  et.	  al.	  2010).	  	  	  	   Weinberg,	  Nichols	  and	  Stich	  would	  have	  us	  believe	  that	  different	  epistemic	  intuitions	  about	  Gettier	  cases	  (Gettier	  1963)	  they	  have	  observed	  among	  students	  from	  East	  Asian	  or	  the	  Indian	  sub-­‐continent,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  WEIRD	  people	  on	  the	  other,	  undermines	  the	  appeal	  to	  epistemic	  intuitions	  to	  justify	  universal	  philosophical	  claims.	  	  (NB:	  It	  is	  unclear	  what	  they	  make	  of	  dual	  process	  theories	  within	  cognitive	  and	  social	  psychology,2	  which	  distinguish	  between	  intuitive	  and	  deliberative	  judgments	  and	  are	  susceptible	  to	  an	  analogous	  WEIRD	  critique	  of	  Henrich	  et.	  al.	  	  Criticism	  of	  the	  dual-­‐process	  theories	  within	  psychology	  does	  not	  involve	  explaining	  away	  intuitive	  judgments;	  the	  dispute	  is	  instead	  over	  how	  to	  provide	  a	  psychological	  explanation	  for	  intuitive	  judgments	  (Kruglanski	  and	  Gigerenzer	  2011).)	  	  	  	   But	  the	  problem	  with	  this	  line	  of	  attack	  on	  epistemic	  intuition	  is	  that	  it	  cloaks	  the	  fact	  that	  experimental	  philosophy	  is	  liable	  to	  the	  same	  criticism.	  Aimed	  at	  traditional	  philosophy,	  it	  is	  the	  intuitions	  of	  self-­‐selected,	  highly	  trained,	  high	  socioeconomic	  status	  professors	  of	  philosophy	  that	  are	  called	  into	  question.	  	  Aimed	  at	  psychology,	  it	  is	  an	  overreliance	  on	  college	  sophomores.	  	  The	  shared	  methodological	  problem	  is	  how	  to	  avoid	  making	  cavalier	  claims	  of	  generality	  from	  non-­‐representative	  samples	  of	  a	  population.	  	  No	  experimental	  philosopher	  denies	  there	  are	  universal	  epistemic	  norms.	  	  No	  experimental	  philosopher	  denies	  there	  are	  general	  facts	  about	  human	  nature.	  	  Yet,	  without	  a	  solution	  to	  this	  methodological	  problem,	  experimental	  philosophy	  cannot	  hope	  to	  evolve	  from	  an	  insurgency	  campaign	  to	  a	  governing	  philosophy	  with	  a	  positive	  program.	  	  	  	   The	  introduction	  of	  formal	  models	  can	  help	  on	  this	  front,	  but	  before	  considering	  how,	  let	  us	  turn	  to	  another	  feature	  of	  the	  Young-­‐Helmholtz	  history.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For overview of dual process theories, see Kruglanski and Orehek (2007), Evans (2008) and 
Kruglanski and Gigerenzer (2011). 
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Counterexamples	  are	  not	  always	  decisive.	  	   Traditional	  epistemology,	  in	  addition	  to	  its	  commitment	  to	  epistemic	  intuitions,	  also	  tends	  to	  rely	  on	  counterexamples	  to	  assess	  theories,	  meaning	  that	  for	  traditional	  epistemologists,	  a	  miss	  is	  as	  good	  as	  a	  mile.	  	  But	  it	  does	  not	  have	  to	  be	  this	  way.	  	  	  	  Look	  again	  at	  the	  Young-­‐Helmhotz	  history,	  for	  the	  RGB	  additive	  color	  model	  is	  by	  no	  means	  comprehensive:	  	  there	  are	  visible	  colors	  which	  cannot	  be	  represented	  within	  the	  model.	  	  Yet	  this	  limitation	  has	  never	  been	  seriously	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  ‘counterexample’	  to	  the	  RGB	  model,	  nor	  has	  it	  been	  viewed	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  physiological	  theory	  of	  vision	  that	  the	  model	  was	  originally	  designed	  to	  serve.	  	  Rather,	  the	  exceptions	  to	  the	  theory	  were	  weighed	  against	  the	  power	  of	  the	  model,	  and	  a	  recognition	  that	  the	  empirical	  basis	  for	  the	  theory—which	  remained	  without	  confirmation	  through	  the	  last	  half	  of	  the	  19th	  century	  and	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  20th—was	  likely	  to	  be	  in	  the	  neighborhood	  of	  the	  truth.	  	  A	  successful	  formal	  model	  can	  make	  it	  sensible	  to	  view	  one	  theory	  as	  standing	  closer	  to	  the	  truth	  than	  another.	  	   If	  experimental	  philosophers’	  complaint	  about	  epistemic	  intuition	  boils	  down	  to	  a	  complaint	  about	  philosophers	  putting	  their	  intuitions	  about	  empirical	  claims	  before	  experimental	  evidence	  to	  the	  contrary,	  and	  then	  having	  the	  nerve	  to	  offer	  an	  
a	  priori	  argument	  to	  justify	  the	  practice,	  then	  the	  complaint	  about	  unchecked	  counterexamples	  boils	  down	  to	  a	  complaint	  against	  constructing	  theories	  to	  resist	  objections—no	  matter	  how	  contrived—above	  all	  other	  considerations.	  	  	  	   The	  problem	  with	  aspiring	  to	  counterexample-­‐proof	  philosophy	  without	  taking	  into	  account	  either	  formal	  or	  empirical	  constraints	  is	  that	  the	  exercise	  can	  quickly	  devolve	  into	  a	  battle	  of	  wits	  rather	  than	  a	  battle	  of	  ideas.	  	  And	  the	  problem	  is	  only	  compounded	  by	  pseudo-­‐formal	  philosophy—the	  unfortunate	  practice	  of	  using	  formal	  logic	  informally—because	  this	  encourages	  philosophers	  to	  describe	  rather	  than	  define	  the	  fundamental	  operations	  of	  their	  theories.	  	  Memories	  are	  ‘accessed	  in	  the	  right	  way’;	  	  justified	  beliefs	  are	  ‘based’	  on	  one’s	  ‘evidence’;	  	  coherent	  beliefs	  ‘hang	  together’.	  	  	  But,	  like	  a	  bump	  in	  a	  rug	  carefully	  pushed	  from	  one	  corner	  of	  a	  crowded	  room	  to	  another,	  this	  reliance	  on	  pseudo-­‐formalisms	  to	  avoid	  any	  and	  all	  counterexamples	  inevitably	  means	  that	  the	  hard,	  unsolved	  philosophical	  problems	  are	  artfully	  avoided	  rather	  than	  addressed.	  	  At	  its	  worst,	  rampant	  counterexample	  avoidance	  turns	  philosophy	  into	  little	  more	  than	  a	  performance	  art.	  	  	   But,	  one	  way	  to	  arrest	  this	  slide	  is	  by	  constraining	  epistemological	  theories	  by	  a	  combination	  of	  empirical	  evidence	  and	  formal	  models.	  	  For	  if	  you	  replace	  those	  fudged	  terms	  with	  a	  formal	  model,	  or	  a	  provably	  correct	  algorithm,	  and	  hem	  in	  imagination	  by	  known	  empirical	  constraints,	  then	  if	  a	  theory	  is	  successful	  in	  explaining	  a	  range	  of	  cases,	  that	  hard	  won	  success	  can	  be	  weighed	  against	  the	  theory’s	  failings.	  In	  other	  words,	  if	  we	  set	  aspirations	  for	  epistemology	  higher	  than	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conceptual	  analysis,	  that	  will	  open	  more	  room	  to	  judge	  success	  and	  failure	  than	  the	  all-­‐or-­‐nothing	  stakes	  of	  counterexample	  avoidance.	  That	  is	  one	  lesson	  of	  the	  RGB	  model.	  Prior	  to	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  RGB	  model,	  people	  only	  had	  a	  vague	  idea	  how	  to	  ‘combine’	  colors	  and	  it	  was	  not	  recognized	  that	  there	  was	  a	  crucial	  difference	  between	  a	  subtractive	  color	  model,	  which	  models	  how	  paints	  mix	  to	  create	  new	  colors,	  and	  an	  additive	  color	  model,	  which	  is	  appropriate	  for	  modeling	  color	  perception.	  	  That	  insight	  far	  outweighed	  the	  limitations	  of	  the	  model,	  and	  it	  is	  an	  important	  reason	  why	  exceptions	  to	  the	  theory	  did	  not	  undermine	  it.	  	  
What	  formal	  models	  can	  do.	  	   So	  far	  we	  have	  been	  discussing	  the	  merits	  of	  formal	  methods	  by	  drawing	  lessons	  from	  a	  historical	  example,	  and	  by	  pointing	  to	  similar	  shortcomings	  in	  traditional	  analytic	  epistemology	  and	  experimental	  philosophy.	  	  There	  is	  one	  last	  piece	  of	  stage	  setting,	  which	  returns	  to	  a	  distinction	  we	  introduced	  at	  the	  very	  beginning,	  between	  formal	  epistemology	  as	  a	  methodological	  approach	  within	  analytic	  epistemology	  and	  formal	  epistemology	  as	  an	  interdisciplinary	  research	  program.	  	  I’ve	  discussed	  this	  programmatic	  approach	  elsewhere—in	  terms	  that	  may	  lead	  to	  confusion—as	  a	  type	  of	  methodological	  naturalism	  (Wheeler	  and	  Pereira	  2008).	  	  Here	  I	  want	  to	  simply	  point	  out	  the	  advantages	  to	  epistemologists	  from	  embracing	  this	  broader,	  programmatic	  view—whatever	  one	  may	  wish	  to	  call	  it.	  	   Sometimes	  a	  formal	  technique	  is	  used	  in	  several	  fields	  to	  model	  a	  family	  of	  problems,	  and	  in	  these	  cases	  there	  is	  often	  an	  opportunity	  for	  a	  formal	  epistemologist	  to	  build	  a	  rich	  repertoire	  of	  similarly	  structured	  problems	  and	  a	  library	  of	  techniques	  for	  working	  with	  them.	  	  Probabilistic	  methods	  offer	  one	  example	  (Haenni	  et.	  al.	  2011).	  	  But	  in	  addition	  to	  fixing	  the	  method	  and	  varying	  the	  problems,	  one	  may	  also	  focus	  on	  a	  single	  problem,	  which	  can	  appear	  in	  different	  guises	  in	  various	  disciplines,	  and	  vary	  the	  methods.	  	  An	  advantage	  of	  viewing	  the	  same	  problem	  through	  different	  models	  is	  that	  we	  can	  often	  identify	  which	  features	  of	  the	  problem	  are	  enduring	  and	  which	  are	  merely	  artifacts	  of	  our	  particular	  methods.	  	  Because	  abstraction	  is	  a	  license	  for	  us	  to	  ignore	  information,	  looking	  at	  several	  approaches	  to	  modeling	  a	  problem	  can	  give	  you	  insight	  into	  what	  is	  important	  to	  keep	  and	  what	  is	  noise	  to	  ignore.	  	  Moreover,	  discovering	  robust	  features	  of	  a	  problem	  can	  reshape	  your	  intuitions.	  	  In	  precisely	  this	  way	  formal	  epistemology	  can	  be	  used	  to	  train	  philosophical	  intuitions	  rather	  than	  simply	  serve	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  rigorous	  exposition	  of	  prior	  philosophical	  commitments.	  	  Here	  then	  is	  a	  partial	  reply	  to	  the	  problem	  which	  besets	  traditional	  epistemology,	  with	  its	  reliance	  on	  epistemic	  intuitions,	  and	  experimental	  philosophy,	  with	  its	  similar	  difficulties	  from	  relying	  on	  too	  many	  WEIRD	  people.	  	  The	  entire	  load	  of	  a	  theory	  does	  not	  need	  to	  rest	  on	  the	  grounds	  for	  its	  claims	  if	  the	  theory	  includes	  a	  reasonable	  model	  that	  gives	  us	  new	  abilities	  to	  predict	  and	  to	  explain.	  	  A	  good	  formal	  model	  is	  one	  that	  can	  be	  put	  to	  such	  uses.	  	   While	  this	  essay	  presents	  a	  case	  for	  formal	  epistemology,	  it	  should	  be	  clear	  that	  this	  is	  hardly	  a	  manifesto.	  There	  is	  a	  place	  for	  experimental	  work	  in	  philosophy,	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and	  there	  is	  a	  place	  for	  intuitions,	  too.	  	  Moreover,	  formal	  methods	  are	  not	  the	  only	  route	  to	  precision,	  and	  it	  may	  well	  be	  that	  understanding	  the	  most	  important	  human	  undertakings—love,	  friendship,	  political	  compromise—is	  hampered	  rather	  than	  helped	  by	  placing	  too	  high	  a	  stock	  in	  precision.	  	  Live	  long	  enough	  and	  you’ll	  discover	  that	  not	  everything	  yields	  to	  hard	  thought.	  	  	  	  	  
Coherence	  and	  Dilation	  	   So	  far	  we	  have	  discussed	  formal	  epistemology	  from	  a	  bird’s-­‐eye	  point	  of	  view.	  	  In	  this	  section	  we	  shift	  focus	  to	  consider	  two	  recent	  examples	  of	  work	  within	  formal	  epistemology.	  The	  first	  example	  reports	  a	  breakthrough	  in	  figuring	  out	  some	  of	  the	  fundamentals	  for	  a	  theory	  of	  coherence,	  which	  remains	  an	  open	  problem	  for	  the	  coherence	  theory	  of	  justification.	  	  Here	  is	  a	  classic	  example	  of	  formal	  methods	  being	  applied	  to	  a	  problem	  within	  traditional	  analytic	  epistemology.	  The	  second	  example	  examines	  principles	  of	  sound	  probabilistic	  reasoning	  and	  the	  role	  that	  independence	  assumptions	  play.	  	  This	  is	  an	  example	  of	  formal	  epistemology	  pursued	  as	  a	  stand-­‐alone	  discipline,	  for	  the	  ramifications	  from	  this	  example	  affect	  the	  application	  of	  Bayesian	  methods	  within	  philosophy	  and	  beyond.	  	  	  	  
Toward	  a	  theory	  of	  coherence	  	   In	  1985,	  Laurence	  BonJour	  provided	  some	  structure	  to	  the	  coherence	  theory	  of	  justification,3	  and	  his	  postulates	  for	  coherentism	  (1985,	  pp.	  95-­‐9)	  describe	  a	  role	  for	  probability	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  C.	  I.	  Lewis’s	  probabilistic	  model	  of	  ‘congruent’,	  self-­‐justifying	  memories	  (Lewis	  1946).	  	  Since	  then	  several	  authors	  working	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  Bayesian	  epistemology	  have	  explored	  the	  prospects	  of	  developing	  a	  probabilistic	  model	  of	  coherence	  along	  this	  basic	  Lewis-­‐BonJour	  outline.4	  	  	  	  	   Much	  of	  the	  work	  in	  Bayesian	  epistemology	  concerns	  coherence	  among	  a	  set	  of	  propositions	  and	  whether	  a	  probabilistic	  measure	  of	  coherence	  can	  be	  adduced	  which	  is	  ‘truth-­‐conducive’—that	  is,	  whether	  a	  higher	  degree	  of	  coherence	  among	  a	  set	  of	  propositions	  ensures	  that	  those	  propositions	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  true,	  ceteris	  
paribus.	  The	  general	  consensus	  among	  Bayesian	  epistemologists	  is	  that	  no	  probabilistic	  measure	  of	  coherence	  fully	  succeeds	  in	  being	  truth-­‐conducive,	  and	  this	  pessimistic	  consensus	  is	  based	  largely	  on	  results	  by	  Luc	  Bovens	  and	  Stephan	  Hartmann	  (2003a)	  and	  Erik	  Olsson	  (2005)	  that	  show	  in	  effect	  how	  any	  probabilistic	  measure	  of	  coherence	  will	  fail	  to	  ensure	  a	  corresponding	  ‘boost’	  in	  their	  likelihood	  of	  truth.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 He later despaired of meeting those demands and quit the theory altogether, but that is another 
story. 
4 See, for example, Huemer 1997, Cross 1999, Shogenji 1999, Bovens & Hartmann 2003a, 
2003b, 2006, Olsson 2002, 2005, Fitelson 2003, Meijs, 2004, Douven and Meijs 2004, Glass 
2006.  
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   The	  general	  question	  is	  whether	  there	  are	  logical	  relationships	  between	  probabilistically	  correlated	  evidence	  (thought	  to	  model	  ‘coherence’)	  and	  incremental	  confirmation5	  (thought	  to	  model	  ‘justification’),	  and	  Bayesian	  epistemology	  has	  investigated	  this	  relationship	  in	  terms	  of	  models	  for	  witness	  
testimony	  (Olsson	  2002,	  2005,	  Bovens	  and	  Hartmann	  2003a,	  2003b).	  	  Think	  of	  a	  witness	  model	  as	  composed	  of	  two	  sets	  of	  things,	  a	  group	  of	  messengers,	  each	  with	  a	  message	  to	  deliver,	  and	  the	  contents	  of	  those	  messages,	  which	  we	  may	  gather	  together	  to	  form	  an	  information	  set.	  	  Olsson’s	  model	  differs	  from	  Bovens	  and	  Hartmann’s	  model	  in	  important	  ways,	  but	  both	  share	  two	  key	  assumptions	  about	  the	  structure	  of	  a	  Bayesian	  witness	  model,	  namely	  	  	   (bw1)	  	  a	  messenger	  i	  who	  reports	  that	  A	  is	  true	  is	  positive	  evidence	  for	  A,	  that	  is,	  Pr(A	  |	  Reporti(A))	  >	  Pr(A),	  and	  	  (bw2)	  	  that	  each	  messenger	  is	  an	  independent	  reporter,	  that	  is,	  whether	  A	  or	  
¬A	  screens	  off6	  whether	  messenger	  i	  reports	  A	  or	  reports	  ¬A	  	  from	  all	  other	  contingent	  facts	  and	  all	  other	  messenger	  reports.	  	  	  	  The	  idea	  is	  to	  ensure	  that	  a	  messenger	  considering	  whether	  to	  report	  A	  or	  its	  negation	  is	  only	  influenced	  by	  whether	  in	  fact	  A	  or	  its	  negation	  is	  true,	  and	  not	  on	  other	  facts	  of	  the	  matter	  nor	  what	  other	  messengers	  might	  be	  saying.	  	  	  	   According	  to	  Olsson,	  these	  two	  assumptions—the	  twin	  pillars	  of	  Bayesian	  witness	  models—offer	  not	  only	  the	  most	  favorable	  circumstance	  in	  which	  to	  see	  if	  there	  is	  any	  hope	  of	  showing	  that	  some	  probabilistic	  measure	  of	  coherence	  can	  possibly	  be	  truth-­‐conducive,	  but	  necessary	  conditions	  as	  well:	  	  	  	   …coherence	  cannot	  be	  truth	  conducive	  in	  the	  comparative	  sense	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  independence	  and	  individual	  credibility	  (Olsson	  2005,	  p.	  3).	  	  While	  these	  assumptions	  may	  seem	  restrictive	  from	  a	  formal	  perspective,	  they	  should…in	  fact	  be	  seen	  as	  describing	  fortunate	  circumstances…[and	  what	  Olsson’s	  impossibility]	  theorem	  says	  is	  that	  not	  even	  under	  fortunate	  circumstances	  can	  there	  be	  any	  interesting	  measure	  of	  coherence	  or	  agreement	  that	  is	  truth	  conducive	  in	  the	  comparative	  sense	  (Olsson	  2005,	  p.	  135).	  	  And	  yet,	  while	  (bw1)	  and	  (bw2)	  may	  seem	  intuitively	  both	  favorable	  and	  necessary,	  it	  turns	  out	  that	  neither	  is	  the	  case.	  	  The	  witness	  testimony	  models	  are	  among	  the	  least	  favorable	  models	  for	  exploring	  the	  relationship	  between	  coherence	  and	  likelihood	  of	  truth	  (Wheeler	  2009,	  Wheeler	  and	  Scheines	  forthcoming,	  propositions	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See Carnap 1962, Cohen 1977, Earman 1992, Milne 1996, Kulpers 2000, and Crupi et al. 2007; 
See Kyburg 1983 for a historical review, and Eells and Fitelson 2002 for recent overview.  
6 See Pearl 2000 and Spirtes et. al. 2000 for a thorough treatment.  
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3	  and	  4).	  	  The	  problem	  is	  the	  Bayesian	  witness	  model,	  not	  the	  general	  features	  of	  measures	  of	  coherence	  and	  confirmation.	  	   Indeed,	  if	  you	  drop	  the	  conditional	  independence	  condition	  that	  is	  built	  into	  Bayesian	  witness	  models—assumption	  (bw2)	  above—there	  is	  a	  measure	  of	  association,	  called	  focused	  correlation	  (Myrvold	  1996,	  Wheeler	  2009),	  which	  robustly	  tracks	  incremental	  confirmation	  (Wheeler	  and	  Scheines	  2011,	  Schlosshauer	  and	  Wheeler	  2011,	  Wheeler	  and	  Scheines,	  forthcoming).	  	  	  	   Briefly,	  focused	  correlation	  is	  the	  ratio	  of	  two	  quantities,	  the	  degree	  of	  association	  among	  evidence	  given	  a	  hypothesis,	  over	  the	  degree	  of	  association	  in	  the	  evidence	  alone.	  This	  relationship	  is	  clearest	  in	  the	  rightmost	  expansion	  of	  the	  measure,	  For,	  which	  is	  defined	  here	  for	  two	  evidence	  statements,	  E1	  and	  E2,	  and	  a	  single	  hypothesis,	  H.	  	  
€ 
ForH E1,E2( ) =df
Pr(H | E1,E2)
Pr(H | E1) Pr(H | E2)
=
Pr(E1,E2 |H )




	  Given	  some	  provisos,7	  it	  turns	  out	  that	  comparing	  one	  evidence	  set	  (e.g.,	  {E1,	  E2})	  to	  another	  (e.g.,	  {E1,	  E3})	  by	  their	  degree	  of	  focused	  correlation	  (with	  respect	  to	  a	  designated	  hypothesis	  H),	  more	  focused	  correlation	  entails	  more	  incremental	  confirmation,	  ceteris	  paribus	  (Wheeler	  and	  Scheines	  forthcoming,	  Schlosshauer	  and	  Wheeler,	  2011).	  	  What’s	  more,	  making	  even	  weaker	  assumptions,	  when	  focused	  correlation	  of	  an	  evidence	  set	  (with	  respect	  to	  a	  hypothesis,	  H)	  is	  greater	  than	  1,	  then	  the	  incremental	  confirmation	  of	  H	  given	  that	  evidence	  is	  positive	  (Wheeler	  2009,	  Wheeler	  and	  Scheines,	  forthcoming).	  	   Our	  point	  is	  not	  that	  the	  Bayesian	  impossibility	  results	  fail	  to	  be	  theorems,	  but	  rather	  that	  they	  are	  only	  representative	  of	  a	  narrow	  class	  of	  models.	  What	  we	  see	  is	  that	  while	  the	  tracking	  condition	  for	  focused	  correlation	  doesn’t	  hold	  within	  witness	  models—because	  ceteris	  is	  not	  paribus—it	  works	  fine	  in	  many	  cases	  outside	  of	  the	  constraints	  imposed	  by	  the	  witness	  models.	  	  Why?	  The	  reason	  boils	  down	  to	  an	  insight	  from	  focused	  correlation,	  which	  is	  that	  there	  is	  a	  parameter	  missing	  from	  previous	  attempts	  to	  give	  a	  probabilistic	  theory	  of	  coherence.	  	  For	  it	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  look	  at	  the	  association	  of	  evidence	  (e.g.,	  the	  event	  of	  messengers	  all	  telling	  a	  similar	  story);	  	  instead,	  we	  must	  account	  for	  the	  reason	  for	  that	  association.	  	  After	  all,	  witnesses	  might	  agree	  to	  agree	  without	  any	  regard	  for	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  matter.	  	  This	  is	  the	  possibility	  that	  (bw2)	  was	  designed	  to	  prevent.	  	  But,	  in	  so	  doing,	  the	  witness	  models	  also	  inadvertently	  scupper	  the	  possibility	  of	  connecting	  a	  higher	  measure	  of	  association	  to	  higher	  likelihood	  of	  truth.	  That	  is	  the	  surprising	  and	  important	  insight	  from	  the	  Bayesian	  impossibility	  results.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Conditions (A1, A2) in (Wheeler and Scheines forthcoming) which is generalized in 
(Schlosshauer and Wheeler 2011) 
 10	  
	   Given	  this	  observation	  that	  one	  must	  account	  for	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  association	  (‘coherence’),	  Scheines	  and	  I	  have	  proposed	  a	  general	  model—called	  the	  CCC	  framework—that	  takes	  account	  of	  the	  causal	  structure	  regulating	  the	  relationships	  between	  the	  evidence	  (or	  messenger	  reports,	  if	  you	  prefer)	  and	  hypothesis	  (the	  truth	  of	  the	  reports,	  if	  you	  prefer).	  This	  requires	  rethinking	  the	  commitment	  to	  Lewis-­‐BonJour	  witness	  models,	  and	  moving	  away	  from	  defining	  coherence	  solely	  in	  terms	  of	  information	  sets,	  but	  BonJour	  himself	  seems	  to	  have	  already	  had	  this	  idea	  in	  mind:	  	  The	  fact	  that	  a	  belief	  was	  caused	  in	  this	  way	  rather	  than	  some	  other	  can	  play	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  a	  special	  kind	  of	  coherentist	  justification.	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  the	  justification	  of	  these	  perceptual	  or	  observational	  beliefs,	  rather	  than	  merely	  appealing	  to	  the	  coherence	  of	  their	  propositional	  contents	  with	  the	  contents	  of	  other	  beliefs	  (so	  that	  the	  way	  that	  the	  belief	  was	  produced	  would	  be	  justificationally	  irrelevant),	  appeals	  instead	  to	  a	  general	  belief	  that	  beliefs	  caused	  in	  this	  special	  way	  (and	  perhaps	  satisfying	  further	  conditions	  as	  well)	  are	  generally	  true	  (2002,	  p.	  206-­‐7).	  	  	   In	  summary,	  taking	  the	  cause	  of	  coherence	  into	  account	  is	  crucial	  for	  making	  progress	  on	  a	  formal,	  probabilistic	  theory	  of	  coherence,	  and	  the	  CCC	  framework	  follows	  up	  on	  this	  idea	  by	  combing	  into	  one	  model	  focused	  correlation,	  for	  cases	  in	  which	  there	  are	  no	  independence	  conditions	  to	  foul	  up	  the	  probabilistic	  machinery,	  and	  causal	  structure	  to	  help	  identify	  how	  associated	  evidence	  will	  affect	  incremental	  confirmation.	  	  The	  CCC	  framework	  is	  hardly	  comprehensive,	  and	  there	  are	  intriguing	  irregularities	  which	  the	  impossibility	  results	  allude	  to	  (Wheeler,	  2012);	  indeed,	  we	  present	  a	  more	  general	  version	  of	  Olsson’s	  impossibility	  result	  in	  Wheeler	  and	  Scheines	  forthcoming).	  	  But,	  CCC	  is	  a	  concrete	  step	  in	  the	  right	  direction	  for	  solving	  the	  riddle	  of	  coherence.	  	  	  
Dilating	  sets	  of	  probabilities	  	  	   Open	  an	  introductory	  textbook	  on	  probability	  and	  within	  the	  first	  few	  pages	  you	  will	  invariably	  find	  a	  definition	  of	  stochastic	  independence.	  	  Defined	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  classical	  probability	  function,	  Pr,	  we	  say	  that	  event	  E	  is	  stochastically	  
independent	  of	  event	  F	  just	  in	  case	  the	  joint	  probability	  distribution	  of	  both	  E	  and	  F	  is	  equal	  to	  the	  product	  of	  the	  marginal	  distribution	  for	  E	  and	  the	  marginal	  distribution	  for	  F,	  that	  is:	  	  (IND)	  Pr(E,F)	  =	  Pr(E)	  ×	  Pr(F).	  For	  example,	  suppose	  that	  E	  is	  the	  event	  of	  a	  fairly	  flipped	  1	  Euro	  coin	  landing	  ‘tails’	  and	  F	  is	  the	  event	  of	  a	  fairly	  flipped	  American	  quarter	  landing	  ‘tails’.	  	  The	  two	  tosses	  are	  stochastically	  independent	  just	  when	  the	  probability	  of	  both	  coins	  landing	  ‘tails’	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is	  ¼.	  	   Those	  textbooks	  often	  will	  give	  an	  alternative	  definition,	  too.	  So	  long	  as	  Pr(F)	  is	  non-­‐zero,	  we	  may	  also	  say	  that	  E	  is	  stochastically	  independent	  of	  F	  just	  when	  F	  is	  
epistemically	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  probability	  of	  E:	  	  (IR)	  Pr(E|F)	  =	  Pr(E),	  when	  Pr(F)	  >	  0.	  Event	  F	  is	  epistemically	  irrelevant	  to	  E	  when	  there	  is	  no	  difference	  between	  the	  probability	  of	  E	  conditional	  on	  F	  and	  the	  probability	  of	  E	  alone.	  Returning	  to	  our	  coins,	  the	  probability	  that	  a	  fairly	  tossed	  American	  quarter	  landing	  ‘tails’	  given	  that	  a	  fairly	  tossed	  1	  Euro	  coin	  has	  landed	  ‘tails’	  is	  ½,	  which	  is	  the	  same	  as	  the	  probability	  that	  a	  fairly	  tossed	  American	  quarter	  lands	  ‘tails’.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  knowing	  how	  the	  experiment	  with	  the	  Euro	  turns	  out	  is	  irrelevant	  to	  estimating	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  fairly	  tossed	  quarter.	  	  	  Finally,	  we	  may	  just	  as	  well	  switch	  the	  places	  of	  F	  and	  E—so	  long	  as	  we	  make	  the	  appropriate	  accommodations	  to	  avoid	  conditioning	  on	  zero-­‐probability	  events.	  	  Let	  us	  say	  then	  that	  E	  is	  epistemically	  independent	  of	  F	  just	  when	  each	  is	  epistemically	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  other,	  that	  is:	  (EI)	  Pr(E	  |	  F)	  =	  Pr(E),	  when	  Pr(F)	  >	  0	  and	  Pr(F	  |	  E)	  =	  Pr(F),	  when	  Pr(E)	  >	  0.	  	   When	  working	  with	  a	  single	  probability	  distribution,	  Pr,	  these	  three	  independence	  notions	  are	  equivalent	  when	  Pr(F)	  >	  0	  and	  Pr(E)	  >	  0:	  	  that	  is,	  (IND)	  iff	  (IR)	  iff	  (EI).	  Indeed,	  you	  are	  unlikely	  to	  see	  names	  for	  each	  of	  these	  notions	  in	  your	  textbook,	  since	  they	  are	  generally	  thought	  to	  be	  expressions	  of	  one	  and	  the	  same	  concept:	  probabilistic	  independence.8	  	  	   However,	  there	  are	  differences	  between	  each	  of	  these	  three	  notions.	  If	  Pr	  is	  given	  a	  behavioral	  interpretation	  and	  viewed	  to	  represent	  an	  agent’s	  degrees	  of	  belief,	  then	  arguably	  that	  agent	  learns	  that	  two	  events	  are	  stochastically	  independent	  (IND)	  by	  observing	  that	  one	  event	  is	  epistemically	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  other	  (IR).	  	  In	  other	  words,	  on	  a	  behavioral	  interpretation	  of	  Pr,	  the	  way	  for	  an	  agent	  to	  justify	  that	  two	  events	  are	  stochastically	  independent	  is	  from	  observing	  that	  one	  event	  is	  epistemically	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  other.	  Furthermore,	  since	  we	  know	  that	  (IR)	  if	  and	  only	  if	  (EI),	  the	  notion	  of	  epistemic	  independence	  seems	  an	  unnecessary,	  intermediary	  step.	  	  Finally,	  knowing	  that	  a	  joint	  distribution	  satisfies	  (IND)	  licenses	  us	  to	  factorize	  that	  joint	  distribution	  by	  the	  marginal	  distributions,	  which	  gives	  probability	  some	  semblance	  of	  acting	  like	  a	  logic	  since	  the	  probability	  of	  (E	  and	  F)	  is	  determined	  by	  taking	  the	  product	  of	  the	  probability	  of	  E	  and	  the	  probability	  of	  F.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Or if there is a distinction draw, it is simply between conditional independence (IR) and 
independence (IND).  
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The	  ability	  to	  factorize	  a	  joint	  distribution	  into	  a	  product	  of	  marginal	  probabilities	  and	  conditional	  probabilities	  is	  a	  tremendous	  advantage	  to	  computing	  probabilities.	  	  So,	  one	  way	  to	  look	  at	  the	  equivalence	  of	  (IND),	  (IR),	  and	  (IND),	  is	  that	  it	  licenses	  learning	  about	  stochastic	  independence	  through	  observing	  when	  one	  event	  is	  irrelevant	  to	  the	  probability	  estimate	  of	  another,	  and	  then	  allows	  us	  to	  leverage	  what	  we	  learn	  about	  those	  independence	  conditions	  to	  yield	  tractable	  methods	  for	  probabilistic	  reasoning.	  	  The	  theory	  of	  causal	  Bayes	  nets	  illustrates	  this	  strategy	  perfectly	  (Pearl	  2000,	  Spirtes	  et.	  al.	  2000).	  	  Our	  own	  approach—the	  PROGICNET	  approach—to	  probabilistic	  logic	  is	  another	  example	  (Haenni	  et.	  al.	  2011).	  	  Yet,	  there	  is	  a	  question	  of	  how	  sound	  a	  foundation	  this	  strategy	  rests	  on.	  It	  turns	  out,	  surprisingly,	  that	  these	  three	  independence	  concepts	  are	  distinct	  mathematical	  notions	  after	  all.	  	  They	  only	  appear	  to	  be	  three	  equivalent	  ways	  of	  expressing	  the	  same	  concept	  when	  viewed	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  a	  single	  probability	  measure,	  Pr.	  	  	  What	  this	  means,	  philosophically,	  is	  that	  sound	  probabilistic	  reasoning	  from	  independence	  and	  conditional	  independence	  assumptions	  which	  glide	  freely	  between	  (IND),	  (IR),	  and	  (EI),	  will	  turn	  out	  to	  depend	  on	  reasoning	  with	  a	  single	  probability	  distribution.	  So,	  those	  sounds	  principles	  of	  probabilistic	  reasoning	  depend	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  you	  have	  for	  assuming	  a	  numerically	  precise	  probability	  distribution.	  	  	  	  Assuming	  that	  agents	  always	  have	  numerically	  determinate	  degrees	  of	  belief,	  however,	  is	  a	  stretch,	  and	  several	  authors	  have	  argued	  that	  probability	  models	  should	  accommodate	  approximate	  or	  interval	  values.9	  Take	  for	  example	  that	  coin	  in	  your	  pocket:	  it	  is	  an	  idealization	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  probability	  of	  a	  single,	  fair	  toss	  of	  that	  coin	  landing	  ‘tails’	  is	  precisely	  ½.	  	  Instead,	  the	  argument	  for	  imprecision	  goes,	  it	  is	  more	  reasonable	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  chance	  of	  ‘tails’	  is	  ½	  plus	  or	  minus	  some	  small	  ε.	  Yet	  opening	  the	  door	  to	  interval-­‐valued	  probabilities	  even	  just	  a	  crack	  introductions	  a	  number	  of	  difficult	  issues,	  some	  of	  which	  go	  to	  the	  heart	  of	  probabilistic	  reasoning.	  	  The	  question	  of	  whether	  there	  is	  one	  concept	  of	  probabilistic	  independence	  or	  several	  independence	  concepts	  is	  an	  example.	  	  Suppose	  that	  the	  probability	  of	  E	  is	  the	  interval	  [l,u],	  where	  l	  is	  understood	  to	  be	  the	  lower	  bound	  of	  the	  probability	  that	  E,	  and	  u	  is	  the	  upper	  bound	  of	  the	  probability	  that	  E.	  	  There	  are	  several	  distinct	  ways	  to	  flesh	  this	  idea	  out,10	  but	  a	  common	  one	  is	  to	  interpret	  an	  interval	  probability	  assignment	  [l,u]	  to	  an	  event	  E	  by	  a	  set	  of	  probability	  functions,	  Pr	  =	  {Pr1,	  Pr2,…,	  Prn},	  where	  the	  lower	  probability	  of	  E	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Pioneers of imprecise probability theory includes B.O. Koopman (1940), Alfred Horn and 
Alfred Tarski (1948), Paul Halmos (1950), I. J. Good (1952), C.A.B. Smith (1961), Daniel 
Ellsberg (1961), and Henry Kyburg, Jr. (1961). Notable contemporary advocates include Isaac 
Levi (1980), Peter Walley (1991), Teddy Seidenfeld (2010), James Joyce (2010), Fabio Cozman 
(2000), Gert de Cooman and Enrique Miranda (2007, 2009). See also Haenni et. al. (2011). 
10 Recent textbook treatments include Paris 1994, Halpern 2003, Haenni et. al. 2011. 
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is	  the	  infimum	  of	  Pr(E),	  and	  the	  upper	  probability	  of	  E	  is	  the	  supremum	  of	  Pr(E).	  	  	  Define	  lower	  and	  upper	  probability,	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  set	  of	  probabilities	  Pr,	  as:	  	  
€ 
Pr(E) = l = infPr∈Pr Pr(E) (lower probability) 	  
€ 
Pr(E) = u = supPr∈Pr Pr(E) (upper probability) 	  	  As	  it	  stands,	  the	  set	  Pr	  could	  represent	  a	  set	  of	  classical	  Bayes	  agents	  who	  express	  different	  judgments	  about	  E;	  Pr	  could	  also	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  model	  for	  studying	  sensitivity	  and	  robustness	  in	  classical	  Bayesian	  statistical	  inference;	  and	  Pr	  can	  also	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  model	  of	  imprecise	  credal	  probabilities	  for	  a	  single	  agent.	  This	  is	  the	  interpretation	  which	  has	  drawn	  fire	  from	  epistemologists,	  but	  it	  is	  worth	  pointing	  out	  that	  the	  underlying	  mechanics	  of	  the	  example	  we’re	  about	  to	  consider	  are	  not	  tied	  to	  this	  interpretation.	  	  	   Although	  imprecise	  probability	  theory	  is	  sometimes	  described	  as	  ‘exotic’,	  in	  reality	  classical	  Bayesianism	  drops	  out	  as	  a	  special	  case:	  	  when	  the	  set	  Pr	  contains	  just	  one	  measure.	  	  From	  what	  we’ve	  said,	  the	  set	  Pr	  may	  contain	  a	  single	  measure	  or	  two	  or	  several	  different	  measures.	  	  If	  classical	  Bayesianism	  marks	  one	  end	  of	  set-­‐based	  Bayesianism,	  then	  convex	  Bayesianism	  (Levi	  1980)	  marks	  another	  important	  endpoint.	  For	  we	  can	  think	  of	  convexity	  as	  a	  closure	  condition	  on	  the	  set	  Pr:	  	  (CVX)	   Pr	  is	  a	  closed	  convex	  set	  when,	  for	  any	  two	  probability	  measures	  Pr1,	  Pr2	  in	  
Pr,	  then	  for	  all	  0	  ≤	  r	  ≤	  1,	  the	  measure	  Pr*	  =	  r	  Pr1+	  (1−r)Pr2	  is	  also	  in	  Pr.	  	  Condition	  (CVX)	  says	  that,	  for	  any	  two	  measures	  in	  Pr,	  the	  measure	  Pr*	  defined	  by	  the	  convex	  mixture	  of	  those	  two	  measures	  is	  also	  in	  Pr.	  	  Informally,	  we	  say	  that	  a	  set	  satisfying	  (Cx)	  is	  closed	  under	  convex	  mixtures,	  and	  adding	  (Cx)	  as	  a	  condition	  is	  common	  when	  a	  set	  of	  probabilities	  is	  interpreted	  to	  represent	  imprecise	  credences.	  In	  what	  follows,	  we	  will	  assume	  (Cx)	  holds.	  	  With	  these	  preliminaries	  in	  place,	  let’s	  turn	  to	  dilation.	  	   We	  say	  that	  an	  event	  F	  dilates	  the	  event	  E	  just	  in	  case	  	  
€ 
Pr(E | F) < Pr(E) ≤ Pr(E) < Pr(E | F).	  	  In	  words,	  outcome	  F	  dilates	  E	  just	  in	  case	  the	  range	  of	  unconditional	  probability	  assignments	  to	  E	  is	  a	  proper	  subset	  of	  the	  range	  of	  probability	  assignments	  to	  E	  given	  F.	  Now	  suppose	  that	  B	  is	  a	  measurable	  partition	  of	  possible	  outcomes.	  Then,	  the	  partition	  of	  outcomes	  B	  strictly	  dilates	  E	  just	  in	  case:	  	  
€ 
Pr(E | F) < Pr(E) ≤ Pr(E) < Pr(E | F), for all F ∈ B. 	  	  The	  remarkable	  thing	  about	  strict	  dilation	  is	  the	  specter	  of	  turning	  a	  more	  precise	  estimate	  of	  E	  into	  a	  less	  precise	  estimate,	  no	  matter	  the	  outcome.	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To	  illustrate	  strict	  dilation,	  we	  recount	  Peter	  Walley’s	  canonical	  coin	  tossing	  example.	  	  
Example.	  Suppose	  that	  a	  fair	  coin	  is	  tossed	  twice.	  The	  first	  toss	  of	  the	  coin	  is	  a	  fair	  toss,	  but	  the	  second	  toss	  is	  performed	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  the	  outcome	  may	  depend	  on	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  first	  toss.	  Nothing	  is	  known	  about	  the	  type	  or	  degree	  of	  the	  possible	  dependence.	  Let	  H1,	  T1,	  H2,	  T2	  denote	  the	  possible	  outcomes	  for	  the	  pair	  of	  tosses.	  We	  know	  the	  coin	  is	  fair	  and	  that	  the	  first	  toss	  is	  a	  fair	  toss,	  so	  the	  Agent’s	  (PrA)	  estimate	  for	  the	  first	  toss	  is	  precise.	  The	  interaction	  between	  the	  tosses	  is	  unknown,	  but	  in	  the	  extreme	  the	  first	  toss	  may	  determine	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  second.	  This	  likewise	  puts	  a	  precise	  constraint	  on	  A’s	  estimate	  of	  the	  second	  toss	  prior	  to	  the	  experiment.	  Hence,	  	  	  
€ 
(a) PrA (H1) = PrA (H1) = PrA (H1) =
1
2 = PrA (H2) = PrA (H2) = PrA (H2).	  	  However,	  little	  is	  known	  about	  the	  direction	  or	  degree	  of	  dependence	  between	  the	  pair	  of	  tosses.	  	  Model	  A’s	  ignorance	  by	  	  
€ 
(b) PrA (H1,H2) = 0, and PrA (H1,H2) = PrA (H1) =
1
2 	  	  Suppose	  now	  that	  A	  learns	  that	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  first	  toss	  is	  heads.	  The	  extremal	  points	  from	  (b),	  namely	  0	  and	  ½,	  can	  be	  conditioned	  by	  Bayes’	  rule	  yielding	  	  	  
€ 
(c) (i) PrA (H2 |H1) = PrA (H2,H1) /PrA (H1) = 0 and
(ii) PrA (H2 |H1) = PrA (H2,H1) /PrA (H1) = 1
	  	  So,	  although	  initially	  PrA(H2)	  =	  ½,	  learning	  that	  the	  first	  toss	  lands	  heads	  dilates	  A’s	  estimate	  of	  the	  second	  toss	  to	  any	  value	  within	  the	  interval	  [0,1].	  An	  analogous	  argument	  holds	  if	  instead	  A	  learns	  that	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  first	  toss	  is	  tails.	  Since	  these	  two	  outcomes	  partition	  the	  outcome	  space,	  i.e.,	  there	  are	  no	  other	  ways	  the	  first	  toss	  can	  turn	  out,	  A’s	  precise	  probability	  about	  the	  second	  toss	  strictly	  dilates	  to	  the	  vacuous	  unit	  interval,	  no	  matter	  which	  way	  the	  first	  coin	  toss	  lands	  (Walley	  1991,	  pp.	  298-­‐9).	  	  One	  way	  to	  interpret	  the	  two	  extreme	  points	  is	  that	  they	  stand	  for	  two	  opposing	  hypotheses	  about	  the	  mechanism	  controlling	  the	  second	  toss.	  Each	  hypothesis	  specifies	  a	  deterministic	  mechanism:	  case	  (i)	  says	  that	  the	  second	  coin	  is	  certain	  to	  match	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  first,	  whereas	  case	  (ii)	  says	  that	  the	  second	  coin	  is	  certain	  to	  not	  match	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  first.	  So,	  on	  this	  interpretation,	  the	  agent	  knows	  that	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  first	  toss	  may	  provide	  relevant	  information	  about	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  second	  toss,	  and	  possibly	  definitive	  information	  about	  the	  second	  toss,	  but	  merely	  observing	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  first	  toss	  is	  insufficient	  to	  determine	  in	  what	  way	  the	  information	  is	  relevant.	  	  Arguably,	  then,	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  first	  toss	  gives	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the	  agent	  information—or,	  better,	  signals	  a	  potentially	  important	  gap	  in	  her	  information—which	  warrants	  the	  change	  in	  belief.	  	  This	  is	  by	  no	  means	  universally	  accepted,	  but	  it	  is	  a	  more	  plausible	  position	  than	  the	  next	  example,	  which	  seems	  to	  reproduce	  the	  same	  result	  while	  assuming	  that	  there	  is	  no	  connection	  between	  the	  first	  toss	  and	  the	  second	  toss.	  	  	   Suppose	  that	  instead	  of	  tossing	  a	  single	  coin	  twice	  and	  hiding	  from	  the	  agent	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  second	  toss	  is	  performed,	  we	  instead	  flip	  two	  different	  coins,	  one	  which	  is	  known	  to	  be	  normal	  and	  the	  other	  of	  unknown	  bias.	  	  Whereas	  in	  the	  first	  coin	  example	  the	  methods	  used	  for	  performing	  the	  tosses	  varied	  but	  the	  constitution	  of	  the	  coin	  remained	  fixed,	  in	  this	  example	  the	  mechanism	  for	  tossing	  the	  coins	  is	  normal—that	  is,	  the	  coin	  tosses	  are	  independent—but	  the	  constitution	  of	  the	  coins	  are	  different.11	  	  What	  we	  are	  doing	  is	  replacing	  (a)	  in	  the	  example	  above	  by	  	  
€ 
( ʹ′ a ) PrA (H2) = PrA (H2) = PrA (H2) =
1
2
PrA (H1) = 0, PrA (H1) = 1,
	  	  which	  appears	  to	  dilate	  the	  second	  toss	  as	  well.	  But	  the	  explanation	  we	  provided	  for	  the	  first	  example	  is	  not	  available	  to	  explain	  this	  second	  example,	  since	  we	  have	  stipulated	  that	  the	  tosses	  are	  independent.	  Yet,	  even	  though	  the	  two	  events	  are	  independent,	  it	  appears	  that	  the	  imprecision	  of	  one	  event	  can	  dilate	  the	  sharp	  probability	  estimate	  of	  another,	  independent	  event.	  	  How	  can	  this	  be?!	  	  	   What	  is	  interesting	  is	  that	  ‘independent	  event’	  in	  this	  setting	  is	  ambiguous	  between	  analogues	  of	  stochastic	  independence,	  epistemic	  independence,	  and	  
epistemic	  irrelevance	  which	  are	  defined	  for	  sets	  of	  probabilities.	  A	  necessary	  condition	  for	  dilation	  is	  for	  E	  and	  F	  to	  not	  be	  stochastically	  independent	  (Seidenfeld	  and	  Wasserman	  1993,	  Theorems	  2.1-­‐2.3),	  which	  is	  a	  bulwark	  against	  the	  paradoxical	  conclusions	  critics	  have	  drawn.	  	  What	  Seindenfeld	  and	  Wasserman’s	  theorems	  tell	  us	  is	  that	  where	  there	  is	  dilation,	  there	  is	  dependence.	  	  So,	  it	  would	  appear,	  the	  flips	  in	  the	  second	  coin	  toss	  are	  dependent	  after	  all.	  	  How	  could	  this	  be?	  	  	  	   The	  answer	  returns	  us	  to	  our	  earlier	  discussion	  of	  independence:	  there	  are	  several	  independence	  concepts	  rather	  than	  a	  single,	  unified	  independence	  concept	  (Kyburg	  and	  Pittarelli	  1996,	  Cozman	  2012,	  Wheeler,	  forthcoming).	  Within	  the	  imprecise	  probability	  setting,	  and	  assuming	  (CVX),	  stochastic	  independence	  entails	  epistemic	  independence,	  and	  epistemic	  independence	  entails	  epistemic	  irrelevance,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  epistemic	  irrelevance	  entails	  epistemic	  independence	  nor,	  shockingly,	  does	  epistemic	  independence	  entail	  stochastic	  independence!	  	  The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 A version of this is discussed by Walley (1991), Seidenfeld (1994), White (2010), Sturgeon 
(2010), and Joyce (2010).  
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reasons	  for	  this	  are	  technical,	  and	  will	  have	  to	  be	  dealt	  with	  in	  another	  essay.12	  	  But	  the	  larger,	  philosophical	  point	  is	  that	  recent	  discussions	  about	  dilation	  have	  foundered	  on	  a	  real	  (if	  understandable)	  fallacy	  in	  probabilistic	  reasoning	  which	  hinge	  on	  assuming,	  falsely,	  that	  probabilistic	  independence	  is	  a	  unitary	  notion,	  and	  that	  the	  principles	  of	  sound	  probabilistic	  reasoning	  which	  hold	  for	  a	  single	  measure	  extend	  to	  settings	  in	  which	  there	  are	  sets	  of	  measures.	  	  	  	  	   This	  observation	  suggests	  the	  controversy	  over	  dilation	  is	  a	  side	  issue,	  and	  that	  really	  the	  issue	  is	  that	  there	  are	  a	  plurality	  of	  independence	  concepts.	  This	  points	  to	  a	  dilemma	  for	  Bayesianism,	  with	  orthodox	  Bayesians	  on	  one	  horn,	  and	  set-­‐based	  Bayesians	  on	  the	  other:	  	  
• For	  orthodox	  Bayesians:	  Imprecise	  probability	  theory	  reveals	  a	  fact	  about	  (IND),	  (EI),	  and	  (IR),	  namely	  that	  they	  are	  distinct	  properties	  which	  are	  collapsed	  when	  working	  with	  a	  single	  probability	  distribution,	  Pr.	  	  Orthodox	  Bayesianism	  hides	  this	  fact	  from	  view.	  	  However,	  even	  if	  you	  reject	  set-­‐based	  approaches,	  are	  you	  confident	  that	  your	  elicitation	  procedure	  for	  determining	  numerically	  precise	  degrees	  of	  belief	  warrants	  collapsing	  these	  distinctions?	  	  
• For	  set-­based	  Bayesians:	  In	  so	  far	  as	  you	  rely	  on	  a	  behavior	  interpretation	  of	  your	  convex	  set	  of	  distributions,	  how	  do	  you	  provide	  a	  behavioral	  justification	  for	  treating	  two	  events	  as	  completely	  stochastically	  independent	  given	  that	  (IND)	  does	  not	  follow	  from	  (EI)?13	  	  	  	  In	  short,	  the	  discovery	  that	  there	  are	  many	  independence	  concepts	  rather	  than	  a	  single	  concept	  is	  an	  example	  of	  research	  within	  formal	  epistemology—which	  in	  this	  case	  includes	  statistics,	  operations	  research,	  and	  computer	  science—that	  has	  far	  reaching	  consequences.	  Although	  we	  have	  illustrated	  this	  discovery	  through	  diagnosing	  a	  common	  misstep	  in	  the	  recent	  literature	  on	  dilation,	  the	  underlying	  point	  concerns	  the	  very	  foundations	  of	  sound	  probabilistic	  reasoning.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 However, if you drop (CVX), then Stochastic independence does not entail Epistemic 
independence (Wheeler, forthcoming). See also (Williamson 2010). 
13 Seidenfeld et al. 2010’s  axiomatization of choice functions do allow for a behavioral 
justification of stochastic independence, but this construction depends on a difference between 
epistemic and stochastic independence appearing in the underlying set of probabilities. But 
consider, for example, a set of extremal points which is not convex and may be indistinguishable 
under epistemic independence and stochastic independence. Even so, the agent may know 
something about the uncertain mechanism which induces that set to select one notion of 
independence and rule out the other without that evidence appearing as a property of the (non-
convex) set of extremal probabilities.  
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The	  FIE-­model	  of	  inquiry14	  	  C.P.	  Snow	  observed	  long	  ago	  that	  universities	  are	  made	  up	  of	  two	  broad	  types	  of	  people,	  literary	  intellectuals	  and	  hard	  scientists,	  yet	  a	  typical	  individual	  of	  one	  type	  is	  barely	  able,	  if	  able	  at	  all,	  to	  communicate	  with	  a	  counterpart	  from	  the	  other.	  Snow's	  observation,	  popularized	  in	  his	  1959	  lecture	  Two	  Cultures	  and	  the	  Scientific	  
Revolution	  (reissued	  by	  Cambridge	  1993),	  goes	  some	  way	  to	  explaining	  the	  two	  distinct	  cultures	  one	  hears	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘the	  humanities’	  and	  ‘the	  sciences’.	  	  Certainly	  there	  is	  some	  basis	  for	  grouping	  academic	  subjects	  the	  way	  we	  do.	  Physics,	  chemistry,	  and	  biology	  are	  the	  pillars	  of	  experimental	  science.	  Although	  the	  skills	  and	  methods	  differ	  from	  each,	  all	  aim	  to	  reconcile	  theory	  about	  some	  part	  of	  the	  natural	  world	  with	  experimental	  evidence.	  However,	  the	  subjects	  studied	  by	  the	  humanities	  typically	  don't	  yield	  to	  experimental	  data;	  there	  are	  no	  experimental	  branches	  of	  history,	  no	  laboratories	  of	  literature.	  It	  is	  tempting	  to	  view	  the	  importance	  placed	  on	  experimental	  data	  as	  an	  indication	  of	  how	  scientific	  a	  subject	  is.	  	  (Some	  experimental	  philosophers	  seem	  to	  think	  so.)	  The	  hard	  sciences	  put	  experimental	  evidence	  front	  and	  center,	  this	  thinking	  goes,	  whereas	  the	  humanities	  either	  do	  not	  or	  cannot.	  	  The	  quarrels	  over	  experimental	  philosophy,	  and	  to	  some	  extent,	  the	  debate	  over	  formal	  epistemology,	  are	  very	  often	  viewed	  as	  pitched	  battles	  about	  whether	  philosophy	  is	  part	  of	  the	  humanities	  or	  part	  of	  the	  sciences.	  Heaped	  on	  top	  of	  that	  fight	  is	  another	  about	  where	  philosophy	  should	  be	  housed.	  	  	  	  Although	  familiar,	  this	  is	  a	  misleading	  picture.	  Mathematics	  has	  no	  more	  to	  do	  with	  experimental	  data	  than	  poetry,	  and	  professional	  cooking	  is	  as	  concerned	  with	  experimentation	  as	  any	  of	  the	  social	  sciences.	  But	  cooking	  is	  clearly	  a	  trade,	  not	  an	  academic	  subject,	  much	  less	  a	  science.	  	  In	  closing,	  I	  want	  to	  suggest	  that	  we	  should	  instead	  think	  of	  academic	  disciplines	  as	  dividing	  into	  three	  categories	  rather	  than	  into	  two.	  There	  are	  formal	  disciplines,	  
experimental	  disciplines,	  and	  interpretive	  disciplines.	  This	  three-­‐way	  distinction	  was	  proposed	  by	  Henry	  Kyburg	  in	  Science	  and	  Reason	  (1990,	  16)	  to	  better	  represent	  the	  activities	  that	  make	  up	  a	  university,	  but	  there	  is	  much	  to	  recommend	  this	  way	  of	  thinking	  about	  academic	  disciplines,	  particular	  those—like	  philosophy—which	  are	  restlessly	  interdisciplinary	  in	  nature.	  Call	  this	  the	  FIE-­‐model	  of	  inquiry.	  	  Mathematics	  is	  essentially	  a	  formal	  discipline,	  the	  empirical	  sciences	  are	  largely	  empirical	  disciplines,	  and	  the	  traditional	  fine	  arts	  and	  letters	  are	  the	  leading	  exemplars	  of	  the	  interpretive	  disciplines.	  	  But	  nearly	  all	  fields	  draw	  upon	  skills	  from	  each	  mode	  of	  inquiry.	  Biology	  and	  literature	  are	  often	  concerned	  with	  formal	  structures,	  mathematics	  and	  psychology	  are	  sometimes	  concerned	  with	  interpretation,	  and	  psychology	  and	  literature	  are	  at	  various	  times	  interested	  in	  the	  facts	  about	  the	  society	  or	  groups	  that	  produced	  an	  observed	  behavior,	  or	  whose	  members	  wrote	  a	  series	  of	  plays.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 This section is adapted from Wheeler 2007. 
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  It	  is	  unclear	  whether	  this	  FIE-­‐model	  would	  help	  in	  organizing	  a	  university,	  as	  Kyburg	  suggested	  when	  he	  proposed	  it.	  	  The	  idea	  would	  need	  an	  administrative	  Helmholtz	  to	  sort	  that	  question	  out—or,	  perhaps,	  a	  Clausewitz.	  But,	  the	  categories	  are	  helpful	  for	  a	  scholar	  to	  have	  in	  mind	  when	  working	  on	  a	  topic	  like	  epistemology.	  It	  is	  not	  so	  much	  that	  epistemology	  calls	  upon	  results	  from	  the	  cognitive,	  computational,	  and	  decision	  sciences,	  and	  insights	  from	  philosophy,	  mathematics,	  psychology,	  statistics,	  and	  linguistics—although	  it	  certainly	  does.	  Rather,	  the	  point	  is	  that	  epistemology	  calls	  upon	  the	  full	  range	  of	  inquiry,	  even	  if	  truly	  harnessing	  together	  formal,	  experimental,	  and	  interpretive	  skills	  do	  not	  readily	  match	  the	  way	  we	  have	  happened	  to	  organize	  our	  universities	  and	  most	  of	  our	  philosophy	  departments.	  	  That	  Snow	  was	  right	  is	  surely	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  he	  must	  go	  on	  being	  right.	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